2. Treaty Development: Okinawa and the Emerging Cold War in Asia
Okinawa was oblivious to the fact that it was about to have a huge US military base burden foisted on it because of geopolitical factors beyond its control. Resolution of the political status issue, unfortunately, would determine this, the catalyst being an emerging ideological war between the US and the USSR. What had been a fruitful, if fragile alliance against Germany and Japan began to unravel as soon as war ended and the victors began to divide territorial spoils. The USSR took advantage of the power vacuum in Eastern Europe, annexing territories outright and supporting the installation of pro-Communist governments in others. From the US perspective this contravened the Atlantic Charter of 1941, and Cairo Conference of 1943, in which the Allied Powers agreed that war was not for territorial gain. In Asia, the USSR took possession of the Kurile and Habomai Islands. Added to this was the continuing civil war between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces and the threat of triumph by the latter. Most important for US planners developing an Asian policy from the mid- to late-1940's, was curbing the spread of Communism. In Europe, the US had established alliances with former allies, amongst which were highly industrialised states like France and Britain. The situation in Asia was much more complex. Australia and New Zealand were far from the frontline, with many other of America’s Pacific War allies infrastructurally and/or economically unsuitable. Indeed, the major US fear was of these nations, and vulnerable newly independent states, falling prey to Soviet promises of economic advancement. In this context the US turned to Japan: the foremost industrialised Asian nation prior to W.W.II. Despite the ravages of war it was largely intact. With investment and planning, Japan could be readied as a partner quicker than any other option. Most necessary now was a peace settlement reversing Japan's role from occupied adversary to postwar alliance partner.
As a small island region with no industrial base to begin with, Okinawa could not be constructed to play a similar role to Japan, even if the will existed. What it did offer was a geostrategic location. Since the US already held de facto control, and given that Okinawa fell beyond the boundaries of postwar allied policymaking bodies, unilateral US control could be assured. As previously stated, MacArthur separated Okinawa from Japan’s other prefectures in January 1946. Although he insisted then that it was purely an administrative move, we retrospectively know there were other important motivations. By late-1947, US policy had begun to take more solid form. George Kennan, head of the Department of State's (DoS) Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and a key figure in recovery planning for European and Japanese occupation policy, publicly outlined a containment strategy by which the USSR would be hemmed in from all sides. While he saw this as primarily an economic policy, necessary for its success would be the creation of a complimentary military base network. To complete the line established from Iceland and Greenland in the North Atlantic, along the 'Iron Curtain' setting East and Western Europe apart, MacArthur proposed that Okinawa become the main force location in an area stretching from Alaska, via Midway and the former Japanese Mandated Islands, to the Philippines. After a visit to Japan in early 1948, Kennan urged Washington to "retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa." On 6th May 1949, US President Truman accepted this view, adopting National Security Council (NSC) paper 13/3 as official policy. Thereafter, effort was underway to obtain a legal basis for, and international recognition of, America's role in Okinawa.
The task was not as tough as one might think. The goals of demilitarisation and democratisation had largely been completed. With the occupation policy focus now shifting into economic reconstruction Japanese aspirations increasingly gravitated toward the reclamation of independence: an idea supported early on by MacArthur. He believed a long occupation would create a level of domestic resentment that might damage any good thus far achieved. While reluctant to become entangled in ideological geopolitics, GOJ policymakers began to recognise that an alliance with the US would probably be a necessary trade-off for independence. In late-1947, Foreign Minister Ashida conceded that in the post-treaty period the US may need to retain forces in areas adjacent to but not in Japan. His idea was that the US utilise the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands as primary force areas, with use of bases in Japan proper only in an emergency. In addition, in late-1947, meetings took place between William Sebald, Political Advisor to MacArthur, and Terasaki Hidenari, advisor to Emperor Hirohito. In no uncertain terms, Terasaki conveyed Hirohito’s hopes that the US would continue its occupation of Okinawa for the mutual security benefit of both countries. Hirohito felt that the US should retain Okinawa for 25-50 years, based on the "fiction of a long-term lease," but that the ultimate sovereignty of the islands would reside with Japan. One should add Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to this mode of thinking. Not that he enthusiastically supported the idea of US military bases on Japanese soil or the loss of Okinawa as a base location, but in as much as it was preferable to Japan rearming. US policymakers could now begin the construction of a concrete peace treaty with Japan.
Although permanent control over Okinawa had never been considered seriously, the notion of a direct annexation had been favoured since the early postwar period by the DoD. The DoS opposed, given that the Atlantic Charter of 1941 had tied the US to the principle of no aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise. The US had also joined in the statement of the Cairo Conference that the powers there represented coveted no gain for themselves and had no thought of territorial expansion. This view was upheld by US President Truman on at least two occasions during the latter half of 1945, but with a different twist. In March, he stated that though the US “wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for…protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the UN Charter" The type of arrangement hinted at by Truman materialised in the form of a ‘strategic trusteeship’ agreement designating the US as sole administering authority over the Japanese Mandated Islands by a resolution of the UN Security Council on 2nd April 1947. This agreement gave the US rights to “establish naval, military and air bases and…station and employ armed forces in the territory." It also set a precedent the US might apply in the case of Okinawa. As good as this arrangement sounded, however, it would not provide the US with the exclusive control over Okinawa it required. Under a strategic trusteeship, US actions would be subject to interference by the UN Security Council and veto powers of the USSR. In the long-term, should Japan at some point become a member of the UN, the US would fall foul of Article 78 of the UN Charter disallowing the existence of trusteeships on another member's sovereign territory.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the likelihood of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan decreased markedly. As the perceived Communist threat grew, the importance of Okinawa's bases increased. Continued control of Okinawa assured the US of a major base in a key geographical area and this control would not be relinquished lightly. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan would have been an effective gesture, but was never a realistic proposal. The US needed to maintain firm control of Okinawa, free from any interference from any quarter. Other factors swayed policymakers. There was no way of predicting, for example, what a sovereign Japan would do. Moreover, Japan’s loyalty had not been tested. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan, even with an accompanying base agreement, was not a viable option. While a military base agreement may be favourable to the US, there would be too many constraints on its control of Okinawa. Of all the options available, therefore, indefinite occupation seemed to offer the most advantages. If Japan's consent could be attained the US would not be subject to any UN interference, could retain complete unilateral military control, and could leave the long-term status of the islands undetermined. The main potentially negative factors were threefold: that is, Okinawa becoming a financial burden; Okinawa becoming an irritant factor in Japan-US relations, and; the chance of unforeseen problems occurring precisely as a result of leaving the status of the islands undetermined.
Regardless, the impetus for a sooner rather than later agreement was provided by rapidly unfolding developments in the region. In mid-1949, the Communist Army crossed the Yangtze into Beijing, establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1st October 1949. Also in 1949 came news of a successful detonation of a Soviet-made atomic bomb. Although there was disagreement on the need for and shape of a peace treaty settlement with Japan within Washington: between the DoS and DoD, and major US allies, like Britain, these events, along with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, focused all parties. US President Truman appointed lawyer John Foster Dulles as his special consultant on the peace treaty and threw him headfirst into the negotiations. The USSR rejected US proposals, arguing that any peace treaty with Japan had to be jointly-formulated by the former wartime allies rather than just rubber-stamped as the US wanted. Moscow accepted invitations to the San Francisco Peace Conference, but mainly to try to block the treaty signing. China's role was problematic. While Britain formally recognised the legitimacy of the PRC, the US sided with Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan. It was decided by way of compromise not to invite either China. Other notable absentees and conscientious objectors were India, Burma, and Yugoslavia. Regardless, the Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan (MTPJ) was accepted and signed by Japan and 48 other nations at the San Francisco Opera House, California, on 8th September 1951.
The status of Okinawa was provided for in Article III, by which Japan agreed to leave the islands under US jurisdiction until such time as Washington applied to the United Nations (UN) for permanent trusteeship. That the US did not was unfortunate. Had Okinawa become a trusteeship it would have qualified for economic promotion initiatives for friendly foreign governments under the Mutual Security Act, as well as other aid programmes, like the Development Loan Fund or World Bank. Okinawa would also have qualified for benefits accorded to territorial or insular possessions of the US. That Japan and the US kept the arrangement semi-legal or "fictional" as Hirohito had urged, meant that Okinawa relied on funding the DoD could appropriate cap-in-hand from Congress and on what could be raised through domestic Okinawan economic activities. One of the saddest aspects of the entire peace treaty settlement in as much as it related to Okinawa was that such a potentially large amount of aid was denied the island region as a result of Japan-US conspiracy.  The cherry on the cake was provided by John Foster Dulles, who stated that Japan would retain 'residual sovereignty' over Okinawa. While giving political scientists headaches for decades to come the formula proved useful. The US pointed to the MTPJ as recognition of its legal status in the Ryukyu islands, thereby diffusing charges of imperialism, and Japan could claim Okinawa was just temporarily under US control, which would go some way towards mollifying negative domestic opinion.
Although Japan regained independence when the MTPJ came into effect on 28th April 1952, there were further strings attached. Beyond signing Okinawa away for an indefinite period, Japan was obliged to accept the Washington-formulated Japan-US Security Treaty (JUSST). Essentially, by the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan was demilitarised and guaranteed "inviolable neutrality." Japan had also adopted a new constitution in 1946, by which the right to wage war was disavowed. Because Japan sat vulnerable at a time when, as the treaty asserted, "irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world," the US concocted a system by which it could retain responsibility for Japan's national defence and greatly influence international security policy. Article I of the JUSST permitted the US to dispose "land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan," as a provisional arrangement. Extended US control over Japan’s defence in the post-treaty period could be regarded as a castration for a sovereign state, but the US was being cautionary in response to fears in the region of a resurgence of Japanese militarism. A continued watchdog presence in Okinawa, and a commitment to the economic reconstruction of states not favourably disposed toward Communism, tipped the balance in America’s favour. Under the MTPJ and JUSST Japan was effectively paroled. Only by demonstrating to the US that it was capable of being a peaceful and responsible state would Japan gain true independence. What should be noted from the outset, of course, is that US military bases in Okinawa and those located on the Japanese mainland were subject to a different set of rules. Whereas the terms and conditions under which US forces and equipment were introduced into Japan were determined by administrative agreements between the two governments, giving the GOJ at least the theoretical rights of 'prior consultation' with the US, Okinawa had no such provisions. In subsequent years Okinawa would become the site for several of the more controversial types of weaponry in the US arsenal: such as biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Japan may have protested the inequality of the JUSST and demanded subsequent revision, but the Japanese people never had to endure the psychological terror experienced by Okinawans living in proximity to missile silos or storage facilities in places like Kadena or Yomitan.
 The term Cold War was arguably coined by journalist and former-Woodrow Wilson staffer Walter Lippmann in his thoughtful critique of George Kennan's containment strategy: Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947). Lippmann's counter-argument to Soviet containment is certainly worth reading, albeit 54 years further on.
 By late-1947, Eastern Prussia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland (Belarus and the Ukraine), Bessarabia (Moldova), Northern Bukovina, and part of Eastern Finland (Karelia) had been incorporated into the USSR as a result of annexation or treaty settlements. Territorial adjustments between the former Grand Alliance powers of Britain, US, and Soviet Union, after the war were complicated, messy, and the cause of much friction. Whereas Britain and the Soviet Union came together in the division of Iran, the US and Britain objected to Soviet involvement in Turkey. Allied statements claiming that territorial aggrandisement was anathema were utter nonsense.
 In reality the US was fully aware of 'percentage agreements' concerning Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, discussed between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in Moscow (the 'Tolstoy Conference') in October 1944, since the US Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, was present for all but the most secret meetings. While US President Franklin Roosevelt certainly and legitimately looked down on the Soviet-British plan to carve up the world to their own advantage as ideologically distasteful, he was realist enough not to challenge these interests and, as a result, was a willing party to the sham.
 It should be remembered that US President Roosevelt had agreed to the restoration of the rights of the Soviet Union to "the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it," and that "the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union," in the Yalta Agreement of 11th February 1945, as part price for encouraging the USSR to enter the war against the fearsome Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria on 8th August. The retrospective question of whether Russia ever possessed rights to the Habomai Islands, or whether it should have acquired rights over the Kuriles, is largely irrelevant given the way that the world was being sliced and diced by the victors. For the full text of the Yalta Agreement see Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 242. It is also worth noting with regard to the Kuriles that early on in the postwar period the US had doubts as to whether USSR possession of the islands was problematic. In an analysis of an early peace treaty draft in relation to territorial clauses the US Office of Far Eastern Affairs argued that while the Yalta Agreement had not precisely defined the area the USSR would take, it was logical that this meant all the Kuriles. Most important, was the recognition that Japan would only be in a position to make claims against the USSR if the US were to propose a "narrow interpretation" of the Kuriles and, in doing so, effectively renege on the Yalta Agreement. US DoS, FRUS: Volume 6 - The Far East and Australasia, 1948 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1974), 657.
 The Economic Cooperation Act, known more widely as the 'Marshall Plan,' was passed by Congress in March 1948. It authorised a total allocation of more than $12 billion of US taxpayers' money over 4 years toward the reconstruction of Western Europe. While legitimately regarded as one of this century’s more unselfish deeds, it was clearly also consistent with the US policy objective of strengthening allies to reduce susceptibility to internal or external communist threat. On the 'Marshall Plan,' see the special commemorative section of Foreign Affairs 3 (1997), 159-221.
 As Gabe Masaaki details, JCS 570/40 from 23rd October 1945, listed major potential US military base areas in the Pacific and graded them from Level 1-3, with Level 1 being of primary importance. Okinawa was given Level 1 status, along with the Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. Gabe Masaaki, Nichibei kankei no naka no Okinawa (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1996), 35-36
 'Jakkan no gaikaku chiiki o seijijo gyoseijo Nihon kara bunretsusuru koto ni kansuru oboegaki (memorandum)' on 29th January 1946. Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa fukki no kiroku (Tokyo: Bunshodo, 1972), 279-280.
 Robert Fearey, then Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus, but an important figure in US policymaking toward Japan from the early-1940's, stated in 1971, that MacArthur's decision was based on the fact that US casualties during the Okinawa campaign had been heavy, and that it was a tit-for-tat measure to counter the Soviet Union's seizure of the 'Northern Territories.' More important, however, was the thought that "the US might need to establish a long-term military presence in the Ryukyus extending beyond the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan." 'Text of Remarks by Civil Administrator Robert A. Fearey Prepared for Delivery at the Dining-Out of the 824th Combat Support Group, Kadena Air Base,' Kadena Officer’s Open Mess, Saturday, 27th February 1971.
 Kennan had previously been deputy head of the US Embassy in Moscow. In an infamous 8,000-word analysis for Washington (known as the "Long Telegram"), Kennan described the Soviet Union as having an almost neurotic sense of insecurity based on a fear of invasion. He argued that it was highly unlikely that there would be much chance of any conciliation between what Stalin had earlier defined as the Socialist East and Capitalist West blocs, regardless of what concessions Kennan's "West" might be prepared to make. Excerpts from this famous telegram can be found in George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), 547-559.
 X, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct,' Foreign Affairs 4 (1947), 566-582.
 The logic being that after an undetermined period of containment (at least 10-15 years) the Soviet Union, with its goal of a worldwide Communist revolution, would eventually implode and collapse.
 This was alluded to during the Pacific War. In reference to the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Conference, US President Truman asserted in March 1945 that although the US "wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire." US DoS, FRUS: Volume 14 - China and Japan, 1952-1954 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1985), 1321-1322.
 US DoS, FRUS: Volume 6 - The Far East and Australasia, 1948 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1974), 700-701.
 PPS Paper No. 28 'Recommendations with Respect to US Policy Toward Japan,' March 1948, Ibid., 692.
 The aims of initial US occupation policies were to prevent Japan from again becoming a menace to the peace and security of the world, and the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government. 'US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 29th August, 1945,' prepared by the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) for SCAP and approved by Truman on 6th September 1945.
 This idea was strangely reminiscent of the fushin strategy adopted as part of the teikoku rikkaigun sakusen taiko, or 'Outline of the Imperial Army and Navy’s Tactics,' by the daihonei in January 1945. The idea was to establish a frontline along areas within Japan's territory but distant from the main islands. A deep battle line was drawn from the Ogasawara Islands to Okinawa, and further to Taiwan. It will be recalled that the principal goal of this strategy was the protection of "the sacred earth of the Imperial homeland." It would appear that, in 1947, Foreign Minister Ashida and Emperor Hirohito were agreed on the need to sacrifice Okinawa for the greater good of Japan proper. This wartime strategy is covered in the latter part of Chapter One of this current text.
 It was confirmed three decades on that Ashida had been ambiguously referring to Okinawa as a potential location for US forces in the post-treaty period. See Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar US-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2001), 141.
 'Enclosure to Dispatch No. 1293 dated 22nd September 1947, from US Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Emperor of Japan’s Opinion Concerning the Future of the Ryukyu Islands."' This memo was dispatched to MacArthur and the US Secretary of State. It remained secret until 1979. The current writer expresses his thanks to Miyagi Etsujiro, then of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, for providing a photocopy of this document.
 The Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan negotiations took place over several years and involved any number of complex issues too numerous to cover herein. The current writer suggests only that the Emperor’s complicity on Okinawa along with implicit GOJ support smoothed the way for the inclusion and acceptance by Japan of the infamous Article III that might otherwise have been a huge sticking point. For an overview of the Peace Treaty negotiations beyond and including the question of Okinawa see Hosoya Chihiro, 'The Road to San Francisco: The Shaping of American Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty,' The Japanese Journal of American Studies 1 (1981), Frederick S. Dunn, Peacemaking and Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). In addition, the US DoS's Foreign Relations of the United States series of books dealing with Japan and the Far East from 1947-1952 should be consulted by those interested in pursuing the subject thoroughly.
 Frederick S. Dunn, Peacemaking and Settlement with Japan, 111.
 US DoS, FRUS: Volume 14 - China and Japan, 1952-1954 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1985), 1321-1322.
 Article 5, ‘Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands Approved at the One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Security Council,’ Kashima Heiwa Kenkyusho, Nihon gaiko shuyo bunsho: nenpyo - Volume One, 1941-196, 99-103. For an discussion of the concept of the strategic area trusteeship and the US dilemma of securing base rights while upholding its commitment to the Atlantic Charter see Rupert Emerson, 'American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies,' Pacific Affairs 3 (1947), 259-275.
 UN Association of Japan, A Concise Guide to the United Nations (Tokyo: UN Association of Japan, 1990), 118.
 One of the reasons why the US had wanted to separate Okinawa from Japan and retain exclusive control was to keep an eye on Japan to prevent a resurgence of militarism in the post-treaty period. Midorima Sakae, ‘Okinawa to Beigun Kichi,’ Nanto Bunka 2 (1980), 4.
 Prior to the San Francisco MTPJ conference, the US had to complete two security-focused treaties: the 'Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) Treaty' and the 'US-Philippine Treaty,' in order to allay their fears of a resurgence of Japanese militarism.
 "Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto...(including the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands)...Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands including their territorial waters." 'Treaty of Peace with Japan (Nihonkoku to no heiwa joyaku),' signed in San Francisco on 8th September 1951. Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa fukki no kiroku, 283 (entire text, 282-291).
 US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1960), 13.
 Documents pertaining to such discussions are not yet available for public scrutiny. It would seem clear, however, that the GOJ and USG agreed that the US would not be required to make an official trusteeship application to the UN.
 US DoS, Department of State Bulletin 638 (17th September, 1951). This was translated literally into Japanese as senzai shuken, or sovereignty which is latent or, perhaps more appropriately, dormant. In actuality, the US Government remained as confused as most other persons as to what this very obscure legalistic term meant. Almost a decade later, and embedded in a document related to the economic and social welfare of Okinawans, a credible definition of 'residual sovereignty' was provided. It was defined as being close to the concept of nudum ius soveranitatus. In essence, embodying the principle that the US would not transfer the sovereignty of Okinawa to a third party. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1960).
 The term "irresponsible militarism" was a euphemistic reference to Communism.
 US DoS, Department of State Bulletin 638 (1951), 464. Since Okinawa had been separated from Japan under the MTPJ, the US-Japan Security Treaty pertained only to Japan proper. In Okinawa, US forces were free to perform any military operation, unconstrained by legal entanglements.
Article 1 of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty, on 28th February, 1952, stated that "Japan agrees to grant the United States the use of the facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article 1 of the Security Treaty. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas, not already reached by the two Governments by the effective date of this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee." This was the right of prior consultation. Ibid. pp. 473-474.
 On 29th April 1959, Ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, in voicing his approval of the changes proposed by the Japanese Government to the 1952 Administrative Agreement, stated that "attention will not be publicly drawn to the fact that there are still facilities and areas in use by US forces without Japanese agreement seven years after an exchange of notes which had contemplated such agreement within 90 days." US DoS, FRUS: Volume 18 - Japan; Korea, 1958-1960 (Washington D.C: US GPO, 1994), 143.