Okinawa suffered comprehensive devastation during the war. A large majority of all private housing, public buildings, and transportation infrastructure to the island's south lay in waste.[2] Public utilities were largely inoperable. Crops and farmland had been shredded by shelling and bombardment, with livestock inadvertently slaughtered during the hail of metal or consumed by civilians and retreating Japanese troops. There was no option but to rebuild from scratch. The big difference was that Japan was now no longer Okinawa's master.[3] Victory in the Battle for Okinawa gave the United States (US) de facto authority in the region. A more concrete, or de jure basis for control was provided by the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention) of 1907,[4] which upheld the belligerent's right to exercise military governmental powers in the conquered and occupied territory of another nation, but simultaneously obliged those forces to protect the people and property of the occupied territory. The US could not unilaterally decide on the shape of postwar policy toward Japan and Okinawa, given that the Pacific War was an allied effort involving the United Kingdom (UK), Nationalist China, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but the US played the largest single role in the campaign against Japan and sought a postwar role commensurate with its wartime sacrifices.[5] US Army General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), succeeded in blocking the implementation of any policy not consistent with his own views.[6] 

The US had no solid plans for Okinawa during the very early postwar period. In the aftermath of war American forces did their best to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population through provision of food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance. The goal had been to launch a major assault on mainland Japan from Okinawa, hence a build up of troops and equipment, but the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, led swiftly to surrender. With the need for assault on the mainland gone there appeared no compelling reason for US forces to stay long-term. Yet as de facto administering authority, regardless of whether it intended to remain for any length of time, it fell on the US to initiate the rebuilding. In outlining Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands (MGR) objectives in December 1945, SCAP ordered that living standards should be restored "consistent with those existing prior to the war," a "sound programme of economic development…be instituted" helping Okinawa achieve the highest level of economic independence, and "a self-governing community should be established" as early as possible.[7] Though US efforts met with much success in the first few years, given Okinawa's state of ruin, there came a freeze in progress. There were several reasons for this.

First, the long-term political status of Okinawa had yet to be decided.[8] The US Congress was unwilling to pour investment in if Okinawa was soon to be returned to Japan. Debate amongst the Allied Powers on the disposition of former territories had resulted in accord that Japan be expelled from areas "taken by violence and greed."[9] No mention of Okinawa was made, suggesting that the islands were seen as an integral part of Japan. Later statements were also ambiguous, with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945: which constituted the terms by which Japan surrendered, talking of Japan's sovereignty limited to the four main islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido and "such minor islands as we determine."[10] Here Okinawa is highly conspicuous in its absence. Allied planners were now either genuinely unsure of Okinawa's status vis-à-vis Japan, deliberately holding the islands with some specific objective in mind,[11] or hedging bets by delaying a decision. Okinawa was clearly considered a primary base area by the US Department of Defence (DoD) in Washington and, like Greenland and Iceland, "necessary for both the security of the US and for the projection of its postwar military operations."[12] Continued US control, either by direct annexation or, at the very least, through a United Nations (UN) trusteeship agreement, was assumed.

The US Department of State (DoS) opposed such a policy, believing that political and diplomatic factors made it necessary to consider the Ryukyus “minor islands which should be returned to Japan and demilitarised.”[13] This internal friction between the moral imperative versus security requirements stances of the DoS and DoD, respectively, would characterise US policy toward Okinawa for the next two decades. Second, upon Japan's surrender the US was financing an occupation of the mainland and Okinawa simultaneously. Funds and manpower were devoted to the demilitarisation of Japan so that it would never again become “a menace to the peace and security of the world,”[14] yet taxpayers could not be expected to continue financing the reconstruction of a former adversary without return. This economic situation could not be divorced from the ongoing debate on the status of Japan and Okinawa. Finally, conflict between the Army and Navy on how Okinawan lands seized during wartime would be distributed hindered resettlement and other MGR civilian development projects.[15] This, in turn, led to morale problems among personnel involved with reconstruction efforts.[16]

As of April 1945, Okinawa fell under US military occupation. According to status survivors were placed in horyo, or prisoner of war (POW) camps, or nanmin shuyojo, or refugee camps.[17] Civilians were placed in one of eleven camps on Okinawa Island or one of five camps on islands nearby. Conditions in the camps were appalling. Poor sanitation aided the spread of disease and sickness. Food was so scarce malnutrition was rampant. Within the camps along the Kin to Ginoza northeastern coast, for example, people were forced to eat a kind of starch produced from the sotetsu, or cycad, and tsupaki, or camellias.[18] People crammed in makeshift shelters which more often than not lost the battle with the rain. Since war was very much ongoing to the south the US established camps in the north. Civilians were relocated along the northeast coast in districts from Nakagawa in Kin, toward Henoko and Oura Bay, or on the northwest coast from Taira as far north as Kijoka in Ogimi-son.[19] In the aforementioned Kin to Ginoza northeastern region there were six nanmin shuyojo, the locations curiously designated by the MGR as 'cities.'[20] Given the state of chaos at this time it is difficult to establish the precise number of detainees at each location.[21] Technically, movement between camps was prohibited. Permission had to be obtained from the MGR. Captured Japanese soldiers and boeitai forces were sent to POW camps located in Naha, Urasoe, Chatan, Yomitan, or Yaka (Kin).[22] Some POW's were transported from Okinawa as forced labour, mostly to Hawaii or North America.

The birth of a postwar Okinawan civil administration under US guidance can be traced back to the nanmin shuyojo. Contrary to expectations, US forces arriving on Okinawa in April 1945 discovered "no government whatsoever through which control of the population could be exercised."[23] While the vast majority of the civilian population was more concerned with day to day survival than political matters, the MGR needed a mechanism through which it could liaise with Okinawans and establish indirect control,[24] The MGR gathered a group of Okinawan representatives: mostly prewar village heads, community leaders, and the like, from each of the disparate nanmin shuyojo camps in Ishikawa 'City' for the inauguration of an Okinawa karishimonkai, or ‘Provisional Okinawa Advisory Council.' Less than week after Japan's surrender in August 1945, this became the Okinawa shimonkai, or 'Okinawa Advisory Council.'[25] Fifteen committee members, most of whom had been teachers or assembly members before the war, were selected by the MGR upon the recommendation of more than a hundred "outstanding Okinawans."[26] Shikiya Koshin was nominated as chairman and Kin-born Matsuoka Seiho vice-chairman.[27] The first order of business was the ironic dissolution of the nanmin shuyojo and repatriation of refugees. The process began in many areas in October 1945,[28] and by the early part of 1946, 80% of refugees had been returned to their home villages.[29] Also in early-1946, the functions of the Okinawa shimonkai were expanded in line with requirements of rehabilitation projects, and each of the 15 members given responsibility for a specific area, such as education, public health, et cetera. On 8^th April, the MGR established an Okinawa chuo seifu, or Central Okinawan Administration.[30] The former shimonkai chairman Shikiya Koshin was nominated by 86 representatives from each of Okinawa’s shi-cho-son to the position of chiji, or Governor. Recognition of this appointment by the MGR came on 24^th April. By October, elections for mayors and council members had been held. Thus, by the end of 1946, Okinawa had in place a local government system, a centralised bureaucracy, and, if you will, a political figurehead.

The conditions that had limited immediate postwar interest in political affairs had stabilised somewhat by 1947. Within a period of 5 months, from June to October, 4 political parties: the Okinawa Minshu Domei, or Okinawa Democratic Alliance (ODA); the Okinawa Jimminto, or Okinawan People's Party (OPP); and both the Okinawa Shakaito and Ryukyu Shakaito, or Okinawa and Ryukyu Socialist Parties, respectively, had emerged. The latter two merged to form the Shakaito, or Socialist Party (SP), on 20^th October. Each of the parties addressed the issue of Okinawa’s long-term sovereignty in their earliest platforms, though each was rather different from the other. The ODA, which would develop into the most conservative of the three, favoured the establishment of the Ryukyus as an independent republic; the OPP, which was consistently left of centre, called for immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan on racial grounds; and the SP, which was more conservative than super-radical, called for Okinawa to be put under a United Nations trusteeship.[31] It is difficult to judge which of the diverse views was more popular among the local population at this stage as there was no system of permanent civilian government and, therefore, no general election. The nature of the system was strictly military, as exemplified in the order permitting the formation of parties in the first place. Further, while the right to organise political parties was bestowed on the people by the MGR in MG Special Proclamation No. 23, titled “Political Parties” (seito ni tsuite) on 15^th October 1947, parties were prohibited from criticising any aspect of military policy.

Although there was no means of accurately assessing local public opinion on the party platforms at this stage, the OPP stance on reversion to Japan seems to have been the weakest of the three in terms of potential public support. The local media, limited to one existing newspaper, the Uruma Shimpo, had throughout 1946 concentrated on how Okinawa had been duped and victimised by the GOJ and Imperial Army during the Pacific War. This view was clearly shared by a large segment of the population. As was covered in Chapter One, while Okinawans had been well assimilated as Japanese by the time of W.W.II. there still existed a certain amount of ambivalence as to identity. A history of negative (and positive) discrimination directed against Okinawa in the post-Meiji annexation through to prewar period, which culminated in the Daihonei’s fushin strategy[32] and sacrifice of the main island in a last-ditch, no-hope battle with US forces, seemed only to illustrate that Okinawa was simply an expendable asset. The end of war provided Okinawans with an opportunity to reevaluate attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese, with the arrival of US forces and of completely new conditions providing the catalyst. These US forces, in contrast to the Japanese, were regarded as liberators who would bring democracy to replace colonialism, and liberalism in place of militarism. Governor Shikiya stated in August 1947 that Okinawa "desired to build a peaceful state under the protection of the US" and that only a minority was in favour of realignment with Japan.[33] Since US forces were providing relief and instituting policies designed to bring self-government and economic self-support as quickly as possible to Okinawa, the measures combined to create support for the US presence and rejection of any swift reassociation with Japan.

By the late-1940's, Okinawa had adjusted to the new political systems instituted by the MGR toward the promotion of democracy and began demanding changes to facilitate an even greater move in that direction. The brand of ‘civilian’ government on Okinawa was still very military in character with no provision for, for example, the public election of Governor or membership of the Okinawa minseifu. The US had rejected the idea of setting up a permanent civilian government while the status of the islands was undetermined in the immediate postwar period, but by this time a decision had been made to hold the Ryukyus as a geostrategic area and construct military bases. Commensurate with this commitment came a change the nature of civilian and military governments. A civilian Okinawa Gunto seifu, or Okinawa Gunto Government, was formally inaugurated on 4^th November 1950,[34] with provisions for the general election of Governor and assembly members. The new military Ryukyu retto Beikoku minseifu, or United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was established on 15^th December.

Although gubernatorial and assembly elections were carried out in September 1950, against the backdrop of the Korean War, the start of the US military base construction programme, and an impending multilateral peace settlement with Japan, the main focus of the candidates involved was relatively vague. There was clearly concern with the post-treaty status of Okinawa and US bases, but this manifested itself in suggestive rather than explicit fashion. Taira Tatsuo, a non-affiliated agriculture union president, garnered 65% of the vote on a platform rejecting both Ryukyuan independence and any UN trusteeship arrangement. Although he did not state that he was in favour of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan this approach was implied. In winning, he comprehensively beat the OPP candidate Senaga Kamejiro, a left-wing proponent of reversion,[35] as well as conservative Matsuoka Seiho, who followed the anti-reversion sentiments of the SP and the ODA.[36] As such, the Governor Taira was basically a liberal, pro-reversion proponent, who had taken two-thirds of the vote. Fifteen out of twenty assembly members elected a week later took the same position as Taira. As soon as the election was over, Taira and the fifteen assembly members formed the new Okinawa shakai taishuto, or Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP).