During 27-years of what was at times an extremely oppressive US occupation Okinawans learned to battle (land seizures), protest (the restriction of rights), criticise (USCAR’s nomination of puppet Chief Executives), and hone forms of non-violent resistance. Okinawans were no less strident in demanding from the GOJ that reversion bring base reductions, the restoration of rights, and economic prosperity. In Okinawa, political reformism (kakushinshugi) was an occupation-induced postwar phenomenon. So much so that by the time of reversion Okinawa had evolved into what Professor Shimabukuro Kuni described as a Kakushin Okoku, or ‘Kingdom of Reform.’[1] This reformist ethos persisted after reversion, with the reaffirmation of Yara Chobyo as the prefecture’s leader in the first postwar gubernatorial elections in June 1972,[2] and in reformist parties gaining a majority, albeit slight, in the (Okinawa-ken Gikai) Okinawa Prefectural Assembly. While the end of the US occupation was cause for celebration, however, it did not offer a solution to the single biggest cause of friction, uncertainty, and sense of vulnerability (to external threat). The front page of the Ryukyu Shimpo on 15^th May 1972 read: “ima sokoku ni kaeru, kawaranu kichi (We’re back with Japan! US bases unchanged).”[3] Given that the land occupied by bases has decreased by just 17.1% from 1972-1999[4] this headline could sum up the entire post-reversion period. Exacerbating the problem, in April 1973, US Marines began closing off Prefectural Highway No. 104 (running through the Kisenbaru subvillage of Kin toward Onna on the west coast) several times a year to conduct live shell firing toward Onnadake and Butodake.[5] A protest movement sprang up from Kisenbaru attracting the support of activists island-wide, Governor Yara and, particularly, his successor Taira Koichi. At one point in September 1976, tensions ran so high that 1,000-police officers were sent to Kisenbaru.[6] Although not base-related, Yara was stuck with a problem inherited from USCAR. According to a directive from 1970, entitled “Establishment of Kinwan Port,” Gulf Asian Terminals was given permission to build and operate refinery and oil storage facilities, or sekiyu chozo shisetsu, on reclaimed land between the islands of Henza and Miyagi in the Katsuren township.[7] The GRI approved this 6-days prior to reversion. Headed by the Kin-wan o mamoru kai (Society for the Protection of Kin Bay) and focused on the environmental damage the project would cause, this protest movement lasted until Yara relented in 1976.[8] Gulf and Esso constructed more ugly facilities along the southeastern coast of Okinawa Island. Although petroleum-related revenues contribute approximately 6% of Gross Prefectural Product (GPP),[9] hosting such eyesores conspires against east coast shi-cho-son getting a share of the lucrative tourism industry. 

While reformist Taira Koichi was elected governor on 13^th June 1976 on a clear platform of continuity from the Yara administration and although the reformist parties held sway in the Okinawa Gikai,[10] these victories were founded on a traditional base of support: that is, leftist political parties and labour unions, that was starting to shift. In the Upper House (Sangiin) elections of 1977, (Jiminto) Liberal Democratic Party candidate Inamine Ichiro beat leftist Fukuchi Hiroaki.[11] This was significant in that it marked a weakening in reformist urban strongholds, gradually permeating throughout a majority of Okinawa’s shi-cho-son.[12] Reformists held power in 8 of Okinawa’s cities prior to reversion but by late-1978 was reduced to 4,[13] with 36 of 53 municipalities now with conservative leadership.[14] This weakening led to divisions in the reformist coalition: OSMP, Shakaito (Socialist Party), and Kyosanto (Communist Party), with factional squabbles breaking out over election candidates, and such.[15] Outside politics, socio-economic change affected the reformist support base. Although the economy was still in a poor state, increased base land rentals were being received, public works projects were on the rise, and greater amounts of GOJ capital fuelled public finances. Moreover, after six-years closer ties between Okinawan and mainland labour unions, political parties, businesses, and organisations of all varieties were forged. As greater organisational centralisation occurred so too did a kind of philosophical or ideological centralisation.[16] As Shimabukuro wrote “Okinawa has been economically, socially, and politically brought into line with Japan and is now similarly organised…while (reversion) has been mutually complementary and has brought greater diversity in prefectural consciousness, the result has been a growing trend toward conservatism and the decline of the Kakushin Okoku.”[17] The inevitable transformation happened under unfortunate circumstances. In November 1978, Taira Koichi suffered a cerebral thrombosis and was forced to resign. The next month, one decade after the reformist administration (kakushin kensei) of Yara came to power in the first public elections for Chief Executive, Nishime Junji, the conservative candidate defeated on that day moved into the governor’s offices at Izumizaki.[18] He remained governor for 12-years, an unprecedented length of tenure for an Okinawan leader in the postwar era.    

It would be extremely unfair to Yara and Taira to suggest that the prosperity Okinawa came to enjoy was down to the excellent economic stewardship of Governor Nishime. In retrospect, and given the impact of the dollar shock and oil shocks on the global economy during the 1970’s, added to the fact that Okinawa still reeled from the base redundancies that sent unemployment soaring, it is unreasonable to think that either reformist could have turned Okinawa’s economy around in such a short time. Conservatives argued that the Okinawa Special National Athletic Meet (Okinawa tokubetsu kokutai) and Ocean Expo (Kaiyohaku), both projects devised by Yara to celebrate reversion, raised inflation and made the economy worse. Likewise, Taira was charged with failing to devote as much attention to the economy as to base-related matters. In reality, the Kaiyohaku got nowhere near to its numerical target in terms of visitors,[19] yet Yara Chobyo could not have conceivably factored war in the Middle East, OPEC, and a national recession into his plans. Nor did he have control over GOJ capital once it got loose. He over-optimistically counted on 6,000 jobs being created by the Kaiyohaku for local people, but could not have anticipated that many of these opportunities would go to mainlanders. Economists discuss the idea of a saru (sieve) economy or a boomerang effect, referring to the fact that much of what is invested in Okinawa from the mainland returns to the mainland, and this is clearly the case.[20] No governor can control private enterprise.[21] Yara certainly affected inflation negatively with the Kaiyohaku, but Nishime must be considered fortunate to become governor as Okinawa was emerging from a traumatic early changeover period, as GOJ investment arrived in greater amounts, and as military land rentals moved ever higher.