A big problem for those trying to formulate credible plans was the fact that the date of reversion and, as such, the conditions to be addressed, were unknown. A jolt of realism came with the communiqué between Sato and US President Richard Nixon in November 1969, that the GOJ and USG would consult on accomplishing reversion in 1972.[1] The GOJ agreed in turn to US retention of bases in Okinawa “required in the mutual security of both countries.”[2] The Tokyo-based Japan-US Consultative Committee took overall responsibility for preparations, but a trilateral junbi iinkai, or Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) was established in Naha in place of ADCOM to consult on measures relating to administrative transfer.[3] This was in recognition of the fine groundwork ADCOM had done[4] and the need, especially at this time, for continuity. A major difference between PREPCOM and ADCOM, however, was that by the time of its first meeting in March 1970,[5] the USG-GOJ balance of power had shifted. While still retaining full authority in Okinawa the USG stepped back to allow GOJ pre-eminence in decision-making. At the same time, just as ADCOM before it, PREPCOM was the sole forum for Okinawa in the policy-making process. By the terms of its creation PREPCOM was duty-bound to take account of the “interests of the inhabitants of Okinawa and the views of the GRI."[6] By late-1970, a working reversion framework had been agreed upon by the Consultative Committee. The USG began designating more administrative functions to the GRI, which in turn benefited from increased GOJ participation.[7] On 20^th November, consistent with the majority opinion that legislation was required, the GOJ approved the first of a three-part set of Okinawa fukki taisaku, or ‘Okinawa Reversion Countermeasures.’[8] In the preamble it was stated that these had been devised “to build a prosperous Okinawa,” and that the GOJ had “prioritised the study of matters considered to exert the most influence on the livelihoods and industrial activities of the Okinawan people.” In formulating the Okinawa fukki taisaku, of course, the GOJ had made “the utmost efforts to reflect the wishes of the GRI and the local people."[9] At least 95% of the contents were ittaika countermeasures covering education, health, welfare, labour, transport, local autonomy, and the like, but there were economic promotion initiatives as well as reversion blow-softening policies. 

Although the GRI was represented on PREPCOM and made to feel part of the planning process this trilateral organ met just eight times over ten months. Given also that the GRI representative was Yara Chobyo, Okinawa’s first publicly-elected Chief Executive, rather than a policy-making veteran as Senaga Hiroshi was, one can see that PREPCOM was more symbolic than practical. In all honesty, few in Okinawa were deluded into thinking that their views would carry much weight as the GOJ behemoth rolled toward reversion day. With the aforementioned fukki taisaku it was generally a case of overlaying prevailing mainland Japanese systems and modus operandi. Since it was not universally accepted in Okinawa that the ideal reversion path was according to Tokyo’s specifications public and private agencies and individuals (and mainland sympathisers) continued to suggest alternative approaches. Between the Sato-Nixon Communiqué in November 1969, and the Reversion Agreement of June 1971, the GRI devised one major long-term economic plan: the Choki keizai kaihatsu keikaku (Long-Term Economic Development Plan),[10] but there were other, mainly non-governmental, proposals circulating on economic development and political status. Okinawa’s main newspapers (the Okinawa Taimusu and Ryukyu Shimpo) and both academic and mass circulation journals (Sekai, Chuo Koron, Chiiki Kaihatsu, Shin Okinawa Bungaku) were the main fora for unofficial initiatives.

The Choki keizai kaihatsu keikaku mixed elements of other plans with a degree of originality.[11] It recognised the fragility of the Okinawan economy in its reliance on US bases and that while reversion may be tough it was essential to unify Okinawa and Japan and “consolidate the foundations for the development of our prefecture.”[12] In particular, social overhead capital was in need of investment. These were prerequisites for Okinawa’s self-reliant (jiritsu) development. In devising a jiritsu strategy, however, it was necessary that “the people of Okinawa Prefecture concentrate their knowledge and abilities on it.”[13] As such, self-reliance was to be achieved though the efforts of Okinawans themselves rather than as a GOJ hand-me-down. In this respect Choki keizai kaihatsu keikaku and the earlier Okinawa keizai no jiritsu ni mukatte are unique. In many plans jiritsu is bandied about, much like ittaika or kakusa zesei, but with no real meaning. The GOJ certainly mentions jiritsu in national development strategies, but simultaneously subsidises Okinawa to a level surely precluding any chance of it. An interesting characteristic of the GRI plan was that it was formulated by sodoin: that is, it was put together by about 100 individual or group participants from the public and private sector, and academics across many fields;[14] a practical approach to policy-making rarely found at the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) level these days. A goal of the GRI plan was "the creation of a society and economy in which all can enjoy a peaceful and prosperous life (heiwa de yutakana seikatsu)."[15] The key was in turning the kichi keizai (military base economy) into a heiwa keizai (peaceful economy). The plan aimed to “achieve a level of parity” between Okinawa and Japan by rectifying the disparities (kakusa no zesei) in social overhead capital, income, and standard of living."[16] It raised the need for economic and cultural exchange with other prefectures at home while performing the role of ‘way station’ for exchanges abroad, particularly with Southeast Asia. An aim was for Okinawa to become “our country’s [Japan’s] southernmost genkan.”[17] The GOJ, apparently impressed by the plan, declared in the aforementioned Okinawa fukki taisaku: daiichibun that it would be accorded “due respect” as the final economic plan was put together.[18]

There was nothing close to unanimity of opinion on the ideal shape of a post-reversion prefecture. While a majority favoured reversion there were doubts whether Okinawa would be better off.[19] This was exacerbated by the fact that negotiations on the precise terms were between the GOJ and USG and that no one had any idea which base formula would be adopted.[20] Clearly, a reduction in US bases would impact the economy significantly. Then, as now, economic uncertainty and bases were the big issues, yet the symbiotic relationship makes dividing them virtually impossible and there, as Shakespeare might say, is the rub. An Asahi Shimbun opinion poll in early-1968 asked about economic prospects if bases were reduced after reversion, to which 34% saw a decline on the horizon, 32% thought little would change, with 34% unable to respond either way.[21] This division of opinion persisted into the Chief Executive elections in late-1968, with many voters not bothering to turn out for reformist Yara Chobyo or pro-US base Nishime Junji.[22] Such a low turnout and only a 30,000-vote victory margin for Yara was hardly emphatic, especially in a very contentious election with stakes so high.[23] The complexity of the military base-local economy relationship complicated Okinawan politics, as it still does. The moral high ground had long been with the idealistic reformists pushing for removal of bases and reversion to Japan so that the ‘MacArthur’ Constitution would apply to Okinawa, but with so many now employed by or dependent on US bases for their livelihoods, more pragmatic material arguments were equally persuasive. At the extreme tip of conservatism some rejected reversion entirely suggesting the base system simply continue as now.[24] Nishime Junji, arguing for a slightly later (1973 or 1974) reversion, was a mild conservative at best. Yara reversed his anti-base position at the eleventh hour, making him a mild reformist at best. At the extreme end of idealistic reformism came those advocating reversion by a different formula, including the creation of a new kind of prefectural system that provided Okinawa greater autonomy in its politico-economic affairs in recognition of a unique history vis-à-vis Japan.

The earliest, and least politically-nuanced work in this regard was by National Diet Library foreign affairs researcher Nishino Terutaro, a specialist in the problems of economic development and political (in)stability in micro-states (kyokubi kokka),[25] mostly ex-colonial territories. In 1968, Nishino shifted emphasis to mini-island states (kyokubi shimaguni) and the extent which experiences in other regions could be of use in preparing Okinawa’s reversion. Malta was used to show the difficulties associated with a transformation from a military base economy after independence from Britain in 1964,[26] and studies of Panama and Puerto Rico in terms of their complex politico-economic relationships with the US.[27] Nishino is possibly best-remembered for his study of the many types of autonomous relationship systems between the inhabitants of small islands and larger states. Nishino prefaces his work by discussing the scarcity of mini-state research, arguing that if Okinawa does not pay attention reversion may be imposed from above, just as the disposition of Ryukyu (Ryukyu shobun) had been carried out in 1879.[28] Okinawa had no choice in the means of assimilation. Nishino’s text is a definitive reference guide to the kind of relations between mainlands and small islands globally. In order to spark some debate in Okinawa he cites the example of the independent small island republics of Cyprus, the Maldives, and Iceland, since some in Okinawa were calling for independence (dokuritsu) from Japan. He also examines relationship systems between several of the world’s major powers and small islands, like the British commonwealth concept (Eirenpo) in the case of Barbados;[29] the Dutch autonomous state (jichikoku) idea in the Antilles;[30] the French départments d’outre-mer (overseas prefectures or kaigaiken) in Martinique,[31] and US quasi-state (junshu) idea in the Virgin Islands,[32] examining the similarities and differences between them.[33] Finally, there are studies of autonomous island regions: like the Isle of Man (Britain); Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Denmark), and; Sicily and Sardinia (Italy). While Nishino is a name rarely seen in footnotes, bibliographic references, or mentioned in discussions about pre-reversion planning for Okinawa his contribution to alternative politico-economic reintegration formulas was immense.[34]

Among Nishino’s contemporaries were a number of more nuanced ideas about Okinawa’s future. More nuanced in that the question of Okinawan identity, in and of itself and in relation to Japan proper historically, was a factor determining the need for, or suggesting the appropriateness of, the creation of a different prefectural system. In a 1970 Chuo Koron article, Illinois University Professor of Industrial Relations Taira Koji rejected any formula where Okinawa would simply be swallowed by Japan upon reversion. By analogy, Taira argued that the people of Scotland, while British citizens legally, identify themselves first and foremost (dai ichijiteki ni) as Scottish.[35] As such, being British did not entail the loss of one’s nationality. With Ryukyu, as Taira leans toward rather than its prefectural designation as Okinawa, impending reversion offers an opportunity for Japan to rethink an antiquated system of regional autonomy and develop instead a republican political system. Taira offers historical evidence to show that unlike Japan’s 46 other prefectures[36] Ryukyu was a separate nation state prior to annexation in 1879. Reversion provided a chance for Japan to, if you will, restore an independent Ryukyuan nationality.[37] Ryudai Political Scientist Higa Mikio argued for a different reintegration formula for Okinawa, but in a much less emotional way. Higa proposed that rather than the GOJ take control of administrative functions from the GRI upon reversion that Okinawa should gain a greater burden of responsibility for its affairs. Given the uncertainty surrounding reversion amongst Okinawans, added to the fact that the GOJ sacrificed Okinawa for the greater good of Japan proper in 1945 and again in 1951, and that Okinawa had suffered discrimination from the mainland since annexation, that a system of special self-government (tokubetsu jichi) was warranted. He proposed the idea of an Okinawa jichishu, or autonomous province.[38] The theories advanced by Higa and Taira were very sophisticated arguments for autonomy that an over-paternalistic GOJ could not comprehend: that is, recognition of diversity in one’s midst through the diffusion of powers can preserve rather than weaken the unity of a state.[39] That neither argument was taken seriously by the GOJ in its reversion Special Measures Laws (fukki ni tomonau tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru horitsu) and Promotion and Development Special Measures (shinko kaihatsu tokubetsu sochiho) in December 1971, did not reflect any flawed logic on the part of Higa, Taira, Nishino, or others, but rather an intransigence toward power-sharing by the GOJ.[40]