13. Conclusion: Managing a Wild Horse with a Rotten Rope

  The foregoing account shows that Kin and Okinawa have had varying degrees of success since reversion utilising positive attributes to counter negatives on the road to realising their socio-economic development aspirations. As the title of this current text suggests, much of the time this has been like managing a wild horse with a rotten rope. For Kin, the US presence has loomed large as a negative factor throughout the postwar period: in terms of the loss of so much land and its implications; in the social changes that live-fire exercises and construction of a large Marine Corps troop station have brought, and; the way that the structure of the economy has been shifted from goods-producing agrarian to non-goods-producing tertiary. At the same time, US bases have been an undeniably positive factor in Kin’s postwar development: in terms of being the biggest single source of municipal revenue receipts, private unearned income, and supplementary base-related community assistance; having been the main source of employment over the years; in bringing Kin to its current stage of urban development, and; in being an exploitable guilt card to play against the GOJ. There are other things that could be listed in both categories. Since any fundamental shift in the military base system affecting Kin is not only beyond the power of the municipal government, but way beyond the range of the OPG (some argue that even the GOJ is too lily-livered to challenge the USG on base-related issues), it is pointless to engage in discussion about what we might like to see happen in an ideal world. Living with military bases is what Kin has done for 57 years and is likely to continue doing for some time. Bases must be factored into Kin’s long-term planning, like it or not. The bitter-sweet irony of this situation was not lost on those applying the Ryukyuan proverb tachinu shichakarado jinya mokirariiru, or “one can profit with a sword at one’s throat.” [1] What remains to be done herein is to outline some observations about the good, bad, and indifferent in the post-reversion socio-economic development of Kin, and to offer suggestions as to what might be considered, or better explored in the future. In no particular order of importance, and taking account of the fact that there is often considerable linkage, they are as follows:

            It is essential that persons from Kin and neighbouring Ginoza be given priority in all job vacancies occurring on Camp Hansen. Only in such cases as local people do not possess a required skill should the vacancy be offered further afield. Kin Mayor Yoshida Katsuhiro and senior US Marine Corps officers on Camp Hansen have been in agreement on this for several years. Each base commander has a responsibility to maintain good relations with the local community, [2] and with the exception of well-publicised or unreported aberrant behaviour in the case of some, for most of the time succeed in doing so in Kin. Part of this is being receptive to requests from the Mayor that are within the realm of the possible. The Kin and Camp Hansen authorities have a good recent history of communicating information, concerns, and problems. In 1985, a unique Gunmin Renraku Kyogikai (Military-Civilian Liaison Council) was established “to support cooperation and understanding” between the US military and the local community. [3] The council consisted of 16-persons from the US side, 10 from the Kin Government, 4 from the Kin Boei Shisetsu Jimusho (Kin Branch Office of the Defence Facilities Bureau), and 2 from the main Ishikawa police station. This was a local Kin initiative to smooth community-base relations. For the last few years, and particularly since construction of the Palms complex on Camp Hansen was announced, senior base staff have actively sought favourable consideration for job applicants from Kin, with only limited success. The impediment to bringing this about is an OPG-administered base-hiring system that is out of control and, some say, riddled with nepotism and corruption. The OPG hives off base-hiring duties to outside agencies, mostly in the central Okinawa area. Such is the demand for base jobs, because of working conditions and the annual bonus, that each vacancy is vastly over-applied for. The main flaws in the system are two-fold. One, the OPG does not demand affirmative action in the case of local applicants applying for base jobs within their community despite the fact that base commanders request it and because it is fairer. Two, while a base specifies what kind of staff are required the actual hiring criteria is decided upon by the agency. Thus, attractive young women with an adequate English ability commonly win over older women with a similar ability. In the US it is illegal to discriminate against applicants on the basis of looks and gender. Base-hiring agencies are among the most important power brokers in Okinawa. If base vacancies on Camp Hansen were open to Kin and Ginoza applicants only local unemployment could be halved. 

            Kin must rethink its strategy for the redevelopment of Shinkaichi, taking into account that three constituencies are to be factored in: the locals from Kin and beyond who come for food, drink, and entertainment; the local families who reside there, and; Marines from Camps Hansen and Schwab (in Nago) who come for food, drink, and entertainment. In the last two Kin General Plans the attraction of Shinkaichi is given as its ikokutekina funiki, or foreign ambience. [4] It is clearly not the case that US Marines are attracted to Shinkaichi because of its foreign ambience. It is they who provide it. However, the Kin Government does not seem to realise that if they do not encourage developments that cater for the US military the ikokutekina funiki will be lost, as is happening. Frankly, Marines may patronise Shinkaichi for its bars, fast food, and brothels, but it is not where they would dream of taking their (boy) girlfriends. As it was over 40 years ago, Marines from Camp Hansen avoiding the seedy bars of Kin for the neon-bright entertainment districts of Naha or Koza [5] so it is today. Okinawa and Chatan are big draws today because of the range of shopping, and bigger, cleaner discos and nightclubs. Kin must look at attracting more varied kinds of entertainment facilities attuned to the requirements of couples, or friends “on the town,” at Shinkaichi, like bigger, brighter nightclubs and live music venues for rock, jazz and blues, coffee shops or (internet) cafés, a movie theatre or cinema multiplex, a bowling alley, and a broader variety of shopping opportunities, along with the aforementioned koen ibento hiroba which is an excellent idea for festivals and open air shows or presentations. Seedy bars, brothels, and clubs can (and should) still exist, but on the peripheries of Shinkaichi as in other military-oriented districts around the world. The idea of daytime shopping and amusement, plus youth and adult evening entertainment should guide core Shinkaichi redevelopment planning. Unlike the nightmare days of 1995, when the exchange rate fell to 85-yen to $1, the rate is likely to continue to favourably improve from a US personnel perspective in the coming years. The more US business that can be retained the better for the economy. Additionally, the more military business that stays in Kin the longer the foreign ambience will remain and, logically, the more local people will come to partake of it. The cleaner and more multi-purpose Shinkaichi can be made the more people can enjoy living there or going there. Kin planners have to start thinking at a more sophisticated level than at present. There is immense potential in Shinkaichi, with the right attitude. 

Clearly, one of Kin’s biggest problems is related to returned bases. On the one hand, there is the problem of wanting bases returned but being denied because this is a Japan-US matter in which Kin has no say. On the other, there is the question of what one can do or does with an area once it is returned. In this, Kin does have a say. Not that this means that Kin takes an effective course of action. Recent experiences in the Ameku and Meikaru districts of Makishi Village (Naha), clearly show that the process of handing back and developing a former base site can be almost as contentious as, and more protracted than, the original forced seizure. A big difference from the climate in the mid-1950’s and 2002, however, is that where USCAR paid land rentals that were well below the land’s productive capacity, to the outrage of landowners, the GOJ has so inflated year-on-year payments since 1972 that many landowners do not want land returned. [6] The GOJ and USG agreed to hand back the Machinato Housing Area in 1977, but it did not occur until 1987. Although urban planning for the area now called Shintoshin could begin, getting consensus among the landowners on what the purchase price would be and how the area would be developed delayed movement into the mid-1990's. [7] In Kin, this problem is encountered with the Ginbaru Training Area, due for return by the end of March 1998, but now sat in limbo. At 57-hectares, Ginbaru is a quarter of the size of Shintoshin. Yearly rentals come to 67-million yen, split between 120 landowners who own 40% of the land, and Namisato (ku) district that owns the remaining 60%. [8] While Namisato-ku is keen to have Ginbaru returned and set about redevelopment accord cannot be reached with the private landowners on whether they would sell the land, or on how much outright purchase would cost. [9] In addition, Kin Mayor Yoshida Katsuhiro and many local people rejected relocation of the Ginbaru helipad to Blue Beach in a process of consolidation, since this will mean no return of Kin’s biggest potential tourist spot for the foreseeable future. Thus, he attempted to stall the SACO process. The Kin Gikai and 80% of the local people that responded to a survey, in contrast, wanted to get the Sobe site relocated into Camp Hansen and push the SACO process forward so that Kin would benefit from a rainfall of GOJ development funding. [10] Thus, all constituencies seemed to diverge.

While disagreement persists, opportunities for the area are missed such as the LA Dodgers long planned expansion of its baseball academies known as Dodger’s Towns into Asia. [11] In 1999, Governor Inamine Keiichi invited them to consider subtropical Okinawa, and by mid-2000, a provisional agreement was reached on Ginbaru. [12] Tom Lasorda, Dodgers VP, visited Kin Mayor Yoshida in June. [13] The feasibility study and initial funding came from the Kondankai, with Governor Inamine’s support based on Mayor Yoshida’s eventual acceptance of the Sobe Communication Site in Kin (after the Gikai had bullied him into it). [14] It was felt there would be few problems for Kin to obtain the estimated 2-billion yen for initial construction in light of Yoshida’s concession and the anticipated Hokubu Shinkosaku (Northern Promotion Policy) investment into the 12 northern municipalities if Henoko accepted a heliport. [15] It all fell apart, however, because agreement could not be secured with the landowners and differences between baseball commissions in Japan and the US emerged on youth draft systems. While the defeat may have finally resulted from external factors the bigger problem was internal. The parties involved in decision-making: the Mayor, Kin Gikai, district Gikai, Kucho (district heads), and landowners, were at odds with each other, meaning little progress was made. Chances like Dodger’s Town (or the idea of another Disneyland) [16] come rarely, if ever, for a quiet northern town. It is strange that no shared perception of Kin’s future development appears to exist among the constituencies; no sense of a broader overarching community responsibility. That, despite the community-oriented mottoes first pointed to in Chapter Two, but which still to a large extent dominate town socio-economic machi tsukuri planning. The Ginbaru area has great potential for Kin, but no property developer will be attracted as is. Private landowners, while not responsible for the golden goose rental dilemma, have to realise the artificially-inflated GOJ land payment system cannot persist forever. The Mayor and Gikai must use Kin’s large base burden and the decision to accept Sobe to better leverage the GOJ before the inevitable public expenditure cuts begin. Whether this will result in enough funding to purchase Ginbaru outright is unclear but it must be attempted. Kin should also forget the return of Blue Beach or permission for weekend use for the foreseeable future. As the only US Marine Corps amphibious training area its return is unlikely. Concentrate instead on what is available. Ending objections to the Blue Beach helipad relocation clears the way for return of Ginbaru.

In terms of returned base sites and their conversion to civilian use, Kin should examine experiences of municipalities in Okinawa and Japan, sites of ex-US and Soviet Union bases across Europe where big reductions have taken place since the end of the Cold War, and at conversion efforts in the continental US. These will be helpful in developing reuse plans for Camp Hansen and the Central Training Area (CTA). In the case of ex-Soviet facilities in Eastern Europe troops generally just withdrew. The local government paid nothing for the bases but was left to clean what pollution problems remained. In the case of the US in Germany, mutually-beneficial agreements are made where US forces swiftly withdraw from a base set for hand back in return for the local government taking responsibility for low level pollution clean up. Of most use to Kin are experiences redeveloping certain types of areas and facilities. There are encouraging and discouraging signs. In the case of Blue and Red Beach, since there are few physical structures they can be quickly reused. At Ginbaru, although the terrain is hilly, rugged and requires a lot of preparatory work before construction can begin, the same applies. Parts of the CTA, especially around Butodake and Onnadake where artillery fire was concentrated for years, will provide the biggest headache because of all the unexploded ordnance beneath the ground. The absence of any effective means of cleaning the area will mean that it will have to be fenced off and left indefinitely as a nature reserve, as was done in Estonia. [17] Large non-live fire training areas also provide reuse challenges, in many cases left as is or designated as nature reserves. More creatively in the case of the Ralsko Range in the Czech Republic, however, the government agreed to turn the area into a rhinoceros breeding ground. [18] Many facilities and structures in the main operational heart of Hansen, like baseball diamonds, bowling alley, cinema, swimming pool, fire station, dormitories, administrative buildings, garages, etc, have instant reuse capability. The area lends itself to urban expansion across from Shinkaichi and it has potential as a college campus or a much-needed northern general hospital. Some of the military-specific facilities will require creative thinking, so the initial GOJ impulse to demolish should be restrained. Kin should actively engage in the debate on base reuse, communicate with other municipalities and base conversion NGOs, and generally avail itself of the wealth of free material. [19] Kin’s solitary effort in this regard was to send staff on an OPG-sponsored trip to the ex-US Air Force and Navy bases at Clark and Subic, respectively, in the Philippines. 

The idea of an emigration materials centre should be adopted. Kin should have considered this before settling on the short-sighted construction of the recent one-floor Kin choritsu (municipal) library at a cost of 400-million yen. A Kin emigration centre is consistent with the concept of tokusei hakki, or “highlighting our unique qualities,” the latest OPG catchphrase to sum up Okinawa’s development direction from 2002, [20] and with the pride most Kin residents take in their contribution to Okinawa’s modern history. Another idea is to establish a northern region materials centre, focusing on the history, culture, and environment, of the old Hokuzan principality, which would also be appropriate for Kin. It will be recalled from Chapter One that the writers of Kin-cho to kichi regretted the fact that the campaign in northern Okinawa during W.W.II in 1945 gets very little attention in war histories. [21] Not that the north-south divide is limited to history. As has been covered in the OPG’s Shinko Kaihatsu plans, northern Okinawa Island and the outlying islands lag well behind in the development game. This is despite the fact that many of Okinawa’s biggest political figures and power-brokers come from small communities and should therefore be able to understand that a gap exists which needs to be narrowed (kakusa zesei). Nishime Junji hailed from the distant island of Yonaguni, Ota Masahide from Kumejima, and Inamine Keiichi from Motobu, [22] yet none has succeeded in bringing development either north or south. For all the criticism levelled at him, Inamine at least advocated that a joint military-civilian airport be constructed in Nago as a replacement for the infamous Futenma Air Station in the knowledge that it would economically revitalise the area. Northern Okinawa has poor transport infrastructure, little in the way of employment opportunities, [23] and is considered only when a new location for a US base is required or when politicians are up for re-election. Politicians based in Naha have perpetuated a north-south divide for decades.

Few will likely recollect that in the mid-18^th century there was debate on the idea of shifting the Ryukyu capital from Shuri to Nago, since it lay on flatland rather than hilly terrain. [24] In the opinion of the current writer, at least, no capital shift but an aggressive urban development policy focusing on and spreading from Nago is vital for Okinawa in this new millennium. There are any number of compelling reasons for this. Firstly, Naha and its sprawling suburbs are too overcrowded and extremely difficult to redevelop. A big rise in Okinawa’s population since 1972 has exacerbated the problem, but the failure of postwar US reconstruction planning is a bigger culprit. Large sums of money were spent on military base construction in the 1950's, with very little left over for civilian infrastructure. Even with massive post-reversion public works funding the OPG has been unable to tackle Naha’s urban chaos. It is no coincidence that the Taira Koichi-inspired monorail construction is an overland project. In Nago specifically, but to the north more broadly, it is not too late for thoughtful urban development planning. Clearly, a second urban centre would take considerable strain off an overloaded south. Yet the whole project hinges on an airport. The proposed Nago, or Northern Airport, need not immediately offer international flights. Routes to Narita, Nagoya, and Osaka would suffice to connect Nago into a global transport network. Consider, for instance, that the centrepiece of holidays to Okinawa at present: the golden beaches of Onna, are more convenient for tourists to reach from Nago than up Highway 58 from Naha Airport. It goes without saying that this kind of development will bring a huge flood of investment and job opportunities into the region. Some creative, integrated northern development planning could lead to an economic explosion. The beaches of Onna are a northern resource, as would be the national park created by the fencing off the Jungle Warfare Training Centre, allowing environmentally-sound visitor access. Port facilities at Nago and Haneji, in combination with a solid water supply, available real estate, and a local airport, is an attractive proposition for any kind of business. It is more than sad that Nago is being forced to accept a US military heliport-airfield to spark its future development, but this is at least half the fault of the GOJ and OPG for ignoring the area for so long. [25]  

Kin’s tourist promotion policy is in need of a rethink. Currently, there is nothing except the strange, narrow Hotel Golden Sun Beach in the Igei district to keep anyone in Kin overnight. Most tourists visit Kannonji and its adjacent limestone caverns, Okawa springs, and the Toyama Kyuzo statue, but this can be accomplished in two hours. Since tourists do not remain in Kin for lunch, let alone dinner, there is no spin-off benefit to shops and food outlets. To be fair, however, it is unlikely that overnight visitors will increase until the Ginbaru or Blue Beach training areas have been redeveloped. In this regard, Kin must avoid jumping like a headless chicken at the first opportunity to develop Ginbaru without bearing in mind an overall strategy. [26] If Blue Beach is to be the tourist centrepiece of the future, Kin should now be considering complementary developments. Ginbaru would lend itself well to large integrated development project combining, health and sports facilities (perhaps some kind of stadium to attract teams for spring/winter training), a large-scale shopping scheme (including perhaps cinema and bowling multiplex), and an estate area to attract creative multimedia, language, art and design businesses. The latter consideration could be combined with the idea of an archive or materials centre. The best that can be hoped for is that Blue Beach is closer to return by the time Ginbaru, the Okukubi River dam project, and Kin bypass, are close to completion.

Kin’s tourism ambitions are undercut, however, by an almost abject failure to appreciate and maximise the resources it does have. To the east and west of Blue Beach are two beachfront areas. The beach to the east is of no use for swimming since it is extremely shallow, but is good for small children and paddling. Unfortunately, all Kin has thus far done is built some concrete steps. The beach is never cleaned (or dredged), there are no rubbish bins, toilets, sun shelters, showers, or decent road access. Prior to reversion this area was earmarked for development but nothing has been done. Older men venture there with friends at night to get drunk. The west beachfront is a combination of sandy patches broken up by rocky outcroppings. Not perfect for swimming, but with massive potential for a public lido-style swimming and recreation area. [27] For a relatively minor outlay a superb public resource can be created. The worst beach policy failure by far concerns Hamada Beach. This is easily Kin’s most popular beach, used by Marines and local people, and a regular Okinawa Clean Beach Club destination. Yet there are no facilities beyond rubbish bins. Unlike Onna, the beaches at Kin have a problem with habu jellyfish at certain times of the year. A man-made sea water lido, regularly maintained, would make the area safe for kids to swim. It is also likely the case, of course, that when Blue Beach is returned and developed as a resort area local people will have to pay for the privilege of entering. It is easy to understand why the Kin Government focuses in on Blue Beach as the jewel in the tourism crown, it clearly is one of the best beaches in Okinawa. But it needs to guard against a blinkered development vision; one that shoots for the stars but disregards the resources it has at its disposal. As is the case with most places that have little in the way of easily exploitable resources (like Okinawa more broadly), creative thinking and planning to maximise every ounce of what it does have provides the best hope for Kin in developing a self-reliant post-base economy.